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INTRODUCTION
With its recent decision in Paducah Area Public Library
v. Terry,1 the Kentucky Court of Appeals became one of a
growing number of courts2 taking into consideration inflation3
or other productivity factors4 when awarding damages for lost
future earnings.' By applying the "total offset" method," the
' 655 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
2 As of the date of this writing at least nine federal circuit courts of appeals and
27 states had adopted some approach for computing lost future earnings taking into
consideration inflation or other productivity factors. They included the 1st, 2d, 3d,
5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th and D.C. federal circuit courts of appeals, Alaska, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Lou-
isiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Wiscon-
sin. See notes 16, 20, 27 and 30 infra for cases cited in those jurisdictions.
3 "Inflation" will be used in this Comment to refer generally to the decreased
purchasing power of money. A more technical definition describes inflation as "a sub-
stantial rise of prices caused by an undue expansion in paper money or bank credit."
THE RANDOM HousE DICTIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 730 (1966).
' Productivity factors encompass all gains, including increased labor productiv-
ity, age, experience, education and inflation, that combine to constitute wage gains
over the course of a lifetime. See note 24 infra for a brief discussion of wage gains.
[Traditionally] [t]he goal of such an award is to give the plaintiff the
amount which, if invested in reasonably safe investments, will return the
amount of future loss at the appropriate time. Thus, the dollar amount
awarded currently will be less than the future dollar amount. The "reduc-
tion to present worth" requires application of an assumed rate of interest,
sometimes called the "discount rate," in order to determine the present
value of dollars due in the future. The higher the discount rate used by the
court, the lower will be the amount of dollars awarded presently to compen-
sate for any given future loss.
Annot., 21 A.L.R. 4th 21, 48 (1983). See, e.g., Chesapeake & O.R.R. v. Kelley, 241
U.S. 485 (1916). See generally 22 AM. JUR.2D Damages § 96 (1965).
' See, e.g., Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1969). The Alaska Supreme
Court was first to utilize this method to account for inflation. The court reasoned that
it would be proper to consider the effect of anticipated inflation on awards for lost
future earnings by not reducing the award to present value, since the discount rate
would be entirely offset by the anticipated rate of inflation. See id. at 671.
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court acknowledged that future damage awards given in one
"lump sum" are "likely to suffer the erosion of inflation."'7 Ex-
plaining its action, the court stated:
We adopt the reasoning that the relationship of interest
rates and rates of inflation are "self-adjusting" and it is un-
necessary t6 concern the jury with either. Because the two
totally offset each other, the jury may make a fair and rea-
sonable award in present worth without introduction of evi-
dence or instruction. The injection of such matters in the
trial is not prejudicial but irrelevant and non-essential; all
however within the discretion of the court.8
The United States Supreme Court has long held the legal
and economic principle underlying assessment of damages to
be full compensation for the injured party.9 This Comment
considers whether the "total offset" method fully and fairly
compensates an injured party. Even though the court of ap-
peals moved in the right direction, the court traded accuracy
for efficiency, and in the process failed to clarify a predictable
formula. Given the United States Supreme Court's historical
objective in awarding damages, further refinement of Ken-
tucky's formula for calculating damages is in order. 10
7Paducah Area Pub. Library v. Terry, 655 S.W.2d at 25.
8 Id. The court was influenced by what it perceived as the expanding recogni-
tion of the "total offset" method. Id. at 26.
9 E.g., Bussy v. Donaldson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 206 (1800). Under Kentucky law,
there is no difference in computation of earnings lost, whether due to wrongful death
or to personal injury. Paducah Area Pub. Library v. Terry, 655 S.W.2d at 23.
10 In reaffirming the commitment to fully compensate the injured, the United
States Supreme Court recently stated:
[F]uture employment itself, future health, future personal expenses, future
interest rates and future inflation are also matters of estimate and predic-
tion. Any one of these issues might provide the basis for protracted expert
testimony and debate. But the practical wisdom of the trial bar and the
trial bench has developed effective methods of presenting the essential ele-
ments of an expert calculation in a form that is understandable by juries
that are increasingly familiar with the complexities of modern life. We
therefore reject the notion that the introduction of evidence describing a
decedent's estimated after-tax earnings is too speculative or complex for a
jury.
Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Leipelt, 444 U.S. 490, 496 (1980) (dictum).
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I. BACKGROUND
In calculating damages, courts are concerned with three
policies: accuracy, efficiency and predictability.11 In general,
when considering the effects of inflation and other productiv-
ity factors on damage awards, courts have taken three basic
approaches: (1) the traditional approach, (2) the middle
ground approach, and (3) the evidentiary approach. 2
A. The Traditional Approach
Courts following the traditional approach, although dis-
counting awards to present value, refuse to consider inflation
or other productivity factors because they consider these too
speculative. 3 This position is somewhat inconsistent, since
discounting to present value "is an economic and mathemati-
cal refinement . .. [even] ...more minute, more fictional
and speculative, than an allowance for inflation.' 4 Although
this approach achieves predictability by eliminating some
variables and efficiency by limiting evidence admitted, the ap-
proach's basic assumptions are questionable. 5
" See Freeport Sulphur Co. v. Steamship Hermosa, 526 F.2d 300, 308-12 (5th
Cir. 1976) (Wisdom, J., concurring). See generally Note, Future Inflation, Prospec-
tive Damages and the Circuit Courts, 63 VA. L. REv. 105 (1977) (discussing the rela-
tionship of the three policy considerations).
" See generally Note, supra note 11, at 125; Note, Considering Inflation in Cal-
culating Lost Earnings, 18 WASH. L. REv. 499, 502-09 (1979).
Another commentator has outlined four basic approaches, although his analysis
of productivity factors is restricted to the scope and admissibility of an expert's pre-
dictions of inflation. See Note, Admissibility of Expert Economic Testimony on Fu-
ture Inflationary Trends, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 135. This writer's four approaches are
as follows:
[The court] can (1) allow economic experts to present projections, subject
to careful jury instruction concerning their probative value; (2) allow the
jury to consider inflation based on its own knowledge or on general infor-
mation supplied by an economist . . .; (3) discard the requirement that
judgments be reduced to present worth; or (4) shift the emphasis of the
controversy to methods of computing present worth that provide an "infla-
tion-proof" discount rate.
Id. at 146-47.
13 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970). But cf. Crab-
tree v. St. Louis S.F.R.R., 411 N.E.2d 19 (IlM. App. Ct. 1980) (upholding counsel's
argument to jury requesting consideration of inflation).
14 1 S. SPEISER, REcOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 2D § 8:9, at 728 (1975).
'5 Courts using this approach assume that inflation is neither persistent nor pre-
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B. The Middle Ground Approach
The middle ground approach recognizes that future infla-
tion and wage gains have an effect on damage awards, but this
method fails to provide a mechanism for the precise assess-
ment of damages. 16 Often, judges simply take judicial notice
of inflation when reviewing damage awards for excessiveness.17
Courts applying this approach only allow juries to use their
common knowledge of inflation in reaching a verdict because
of a fear that experts might exert undue influence on a jury's
decision.18 While efficient, this approach lacks both accuracy
and predictability because the factfinder is allowed to specu-
late on complicated economic variables without the aid of
experts.
C. The Evidentiary Approach
The evidentiary approach, in its several variations, allows
the use of expert testimony and attempts to reconcile the ten-
sion between accuracy and efficiency. The evidentiary ap-
proach can be broken down into three separate methods: (1)
dictable. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d at 804.
10 See, e.g., Morvant v. Construction Aggregates, 570 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1978)
(jury allowed to consider inflation but no expert testimony on the subject admitted),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1979); Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117 (6th
Cir. 1978) (jury allowed to consider future inflation generally so long as testimony
avoided specific rates projected into the future); Willmore v. Hertz Corp., 437 F.2d
357 (6th Cir. 1971) (applied Michigan law to uphold jury instruction that members
could consider inflation even though no testimony had been heard); Richmond Gas
Corp. v. Reeves, 302 N.E.2d 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (consideration of general infla-
tionary factors within the discretion of the court); Bell Aerospace Corp. v. Anderson,
478 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (elements of wage increases and inflation con-
sidered generally before awarding damages). See also Deweese v. United States, 576
F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1978) (error for trial court to refuse to consider inflationary
trends); Wright v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. La. 1981) (applied a six
percent inflation factor without expert testimony).
1 This is apparently the approach Kentucky courts have taken in the past. "On
appeal, the appellate court has considered excessiveness with an eye on the interest
earning capacity of the award as well as the probable decrease (future inflation) in
purchasing power of the award." Paducah Area Pub. Library v. Terry, 655 S.W.2d 19,
25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Western Ky. Coal Co. v. Shoulders' Adm'r., 28 S.W.2d
479 (Ky. 1930)).
I See, e.g., Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d at 1122 (expert testimony
projecting to the year 2002 was too speculative).
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the "offset present value" method, (2) the independent incor-
poration method, and (3) the "total offset" method'9 used by
the court in Terry.0
1. The "Offset Present Value" Method
This method is a simple calculation, limited to compensa-
tion for the effects of inflation on the award for future earn-
ings.2' In Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,22 the court cal-
culated an "inflation adjusted" discount rate by subtracting
the average yearly price increase over the past eighteen years
(2.87 %) from the average yearly yield from deposits in mutual
savings banks (4.14%), arriving at an approximate "inflation
adjusted" discount rate (1.5% ).23 After allowing extensive tes-
timony detailing the decedent's grades and employment his-
tory in order to determine productivity gains that she might
have enjoyed over her lifetime,24 the court discounted the
jury's award by 1.5%.25 Critics of this method question the
wisdom of projecting future inflation and interest rates using
1, See Note, Future Inflation as a Factor in the Determination of Damages, 12
U. TOL. L. REv. 369, 383-89 (1981) (discussion of these three methods).
20 See Paducah Area Pub. Library v. Terry, 655 S.W.2d at 25.
" Note, supra note 19, at 385.
22 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 524 F.2d 384 (1st Cir. 1979). See also Doca Mercante v. Marina Ni-
caraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.) (inflation rate reduces discount rate to two
percent rate), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1980); Espana v. United States, 616 F.2d 41
(2d Cir. 1980) (inflation rate reduces discount rate to five percent); Davis v. New
Orleans Public Belt R.R., 375 So.2d 395 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (three percent inflation
factor and three percent wage increase factor added to award after reduction to pre-
sent value); Busch v. Busch Const., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977) (expert testi-
mony permitted to adjust discount figure for inflation).
23 382 F. Supp. at 1293. The actual figure arrived at was 1.27% but the court
rounded the figure upward to 1.5%. Id.
21 A common mistake made by courts is failing to distinguish inflation from
other productivity factors which might influence overall wage gains. Future earning
capacity may increase even in the absence of inflation, as at least four factors contrib-
ute to an increase in wages over the life of a worker: (1) education level, (2) age and
maturity, (3) increases in worker productivity due to experience and mechanization,
and (4) inflation. If an award is to compensate fully, then it must be responsive to
each of these variables. Henderson, The Consideration of Increased Productivity and
the Discounting of Future Earnings to Present Value, 20 S.D.L. REv. 307, 312
(1975).
" 382 F. Supp. at 1283-87.
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historical data to estimate potential changes."
2. The "Independent Incorporation" Method27
While perhaps the most accurate, the "independent in-
corporation" method is also time consuming and complicated.
By increasing each year's estimated earnings, including wage
increases due to productivity gains, by the compounded rate
of inflation as set by competent expert testimony, the court
arrives at "inflation adjusted" earnings which are then dis-
counted to present value by a discount rate determined by ex-
pert testimony.28 The obvious weakness of this position is that
28 See note 97 infra and accompanying text discussing attempts to project
inflation.
217 This approach has been adopted by a number of federal and state courts. See,
e.g., Taenzler v. Burlington Northern, 608 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1979) (utilized "limited"
expert testimony); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978) (apply-
ing Ohio law, expert testimony utilized); Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372
(10th Cir. 1977) ("total offset" method rejected in favor of general evidentiary ap-
proach); Johnson v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Mont. 1981) (future wage
increases considered with help of expert testimony); Hardin v. United States, 485 F.
Supp. 380 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (applying Georgia law, expert testimony allowed); Mullins
v. Seals, 416 F. Supp. 1098 (W.D. Va. 1976) (applying Virginia law, allowed expert
testimony on increased productivity); District of Columbia v. Barriteau, 399 A.2d 563
(D.C. 1979) (allowed evidence of inflation within reasonable limits); Seaboard Coast
Line Rail Co. v. Garrison, 336 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (mere fact that
the future rate of inflation is uncertain is not sufficient to exclude expert testimony);
Lumber Terminals, Inc. v. Nowakowski, 373 A.2d 282 (Md. 1977) (expert testimony
utilized); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672 (Minn. 1977)
(expert testimony allowed to help jury calculate discount rate and inflation rate); Ott
v. Frank, 277 N.W.2d 251 (Neb. 1979) (expert testimony allowed as to projected in-
crease in wages and projected increase in tax shelters); Nelson v. State, 431 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1980) (reasonably certain calculations required); Plourd v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 513 P.2d 1140 (Or. 1973) (future wage gains considered); Markham v.
Cross Transp., Inc., 376 A.2d 1359 (R.I. 1977) (wage growth considered by trier of
fact); Cords v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 672 (Wis. 1977) (error for courts to refuse ex-
pert testimony on inflation).
28 In United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975), the court of appeals
accepted the calculations of the district court where "inflation adjusted" earnings (or
"lost gross earnings" as the court in English described them) were calculated using a
base income figure of $21,800, which was the decedent's earnings for 1970. By apply-
ing a projection factor of 7.5% annual increase over the estimated productive life of
the decedent (in this case seven years) the district court arrived at $169,000 for ad-
justed earnings. The 7.5% projected annual increase used to compute an estimate of
the decedent's lost gross earnings was based on the earnings growth history of persons
employed in contract construction. This figure not only reflected pay increases due to
regular promotions and increased skill but incorporated an inflationary element as
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inflation rates and interest rates must remain as projected at
trial or the plaintiff may be unjustly compensated.
3. The "Total Offset" Method
In Beaulieu v. Elliot,29 the Alaska Supreme Court devel-
oped the "total offset" method as a viable alternative to the
traditional reduction to present value.30 Recognizing the fact
that inflationary expectations affect interest rates,3 ' the
Alaska court refused to reduce the plaintiff's award on the
theory that over the course of the plaintiff's lifetime, the infla-
tion rate would completely offset the interest rate used to re-
dihce the award to present value. 2 Without the aid of expert
testimony, the court assumed that inflation would be roughly
equivalent to the discount rate, thereby calculating damages
well. Id. at 71.
The $169,000 was then reduced by $49,000 for personal consumption leaving
$120,000 undiscounted net earnings loss. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then
instructed the district court to reduce the award to present value using an appropri-
ate discount rate. Id. at 76. The circuit court barred the district court from assuming
that the discount rate and inflation rate would net to zero, requiring that estimates of
inflation and productivity be based on competent evidence and that each award for
"inflation adjusted" earnings be reduced to present value. Id. at 75.
1, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1969).
30 See id. See also Draisma v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (after expert testimony, the court found inflation rate and discount rate
matched); Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974) (expert testimony proved
discount and inflation rates offset one another); Resner v. North R.R., 505 P.2d 86
(Mont. 1973) (jury calculated both five percent wage growth rate and five percent
discount rate); Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1980) (productivity gains
calculated separately by expert testimony and offset method used to account solely
for inflation).
" Irving Fisher's work on the effect of inflationary expectations on interest rates
is the basis of the "offset method." Formuzis & O'Donnell, Inflation and the Valua-
tion of Future Economic Losses, 38 MONT. L. REv. 297, 300 (1977). Fischer noted that
inflation and interest rates are interrelated. When people expect prices to rise, they
are less likely to save money, electing instead to spend while prices are lower, which
causes capital market supply funds to dwindle. This, in turn, causes interest rates to
rise as supply lessens. The higher the inflation, the higher the interest rates, and vice
versa. See I. FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST (1930).
" 434 P.2d at 671. See Carlson, Economic Analysis v. Courtroom Controversy,
the Present Value of Future Earnings, 62 A.B.A. J. 628 (1976) (analysis of the ra-
tionale behind the "total offset" method). But see Coyne, Present Value of Future
Earnings: A Sensible Alternative to Simplistic Methodologies, 49 INs. COUNS. J. 25
(1982).
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simply by multiplying base earnings"3 by the number of pro-
ductive years the deceased would have enjoyed.34 The Beau-
lieu court refused to consider productivity increases.3 5
II. RECENT COURT DECISIONS APPLYING THE "TOTAL OFFSET"
METHOD
A. Paducah Area Public Library v. Terry"
In Terry, the plaintiff sustained permanent injury when
the vehicle in which she was a passenger was struck head-on
by a vehicle owned and operated by the Paducah Area Public
Library.3 7 At trial, the only issue for the jury was the amount
of damages.38 The jury returned a verdict of $983,456.57.11
More than half the verdict was compensation for physical
pain and suffering.40 The trial judge refused to permit evi-
3s Base earnings simply means annual salary at the time of death or injury.
.1 434 P.2d at 670-71.
35 Id. at 672. One commentator pointed out the inconsistencies of Beaulieu:
The Beaulieu court applied a somewhat circular logic in defending the deci-
sion to refuse productivity increases as well as refusing to discount the
award to present value. It held that failure to discount an award would
offset any loss of potential wage increases the plaintiff might have accrued.
The court then stated, however: "Thus if there is any fear that failure to
reduce the award will give the plaintiff more than he is entitled to ... such
fear is obviated by the fact that the award may well be deficient in that it
does not take into account probable wage increases."
Note, The Adjustment of Awards for Lost Future Earning Capacity to Compensate
for Inflation and Increased Productivity: Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 7 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 139, 150 n.77 (1981) (citing Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d at 672). Likewise, the
Beaulieu approach was recently criticized by the Fifth Circuit.
Although we find it imprudent to adopt the Alaska Rule, because it is
fraught with the same inflexibility that Penrod exhibited, we approve the
use of any of the methods outlined for calculating future wage losses that
results in fairness to plaintiffs and defendants. We see no reason to make
the economic judgment ... that the rate of future inflation will be
equivalent to future interest rates.
Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 307 (5th Cir. 1982). The court, apparently
approved the "offset present value" method outlined in Feldman v. Allegheny Air-
lines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. at 1271, while reserving the right to use other methods as
well.
6 655 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
37 Id. at 21.
38 Plaintiff was granted a directed verdict on the issue of liability. Id.
39 Id. at 22.
40 Id. Awards for pain and suffering are not reduced to present value in Ken-
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dence of present worth or to instruct the jury to reduce the
award to present worth.41 On appeal,42 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals upheld the judge's decision, citing as authority the
"total offset" method outlined in Beaulieu.43
Unless the "total offset" method is carefully applied, un-
just awards result. Analysis of other courts' use of the "total
offset" method reveals how the court in Terry might have
more accurately utilized the Alaska court's method.
B. Pennsylvania's Adoption of the Total Offset Method in
Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz44
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the "total off-
set" method in Kaczkowski, relying on the method in a way
that reflected a consideration of all factors impinging upon fu-
ture wage increases.45 The court was aware that "[t]he orderly
development of the law must be responsive to new conditions
and to the persuasion of superior reasoning," and embarked
on an analysis of statistical and economic evidence to substan-
tiate acceptance of inflation and increased productivity as fac-
tors in the calculation of lost future earnings.46 After consider-
ing the general approaches taken by other courts, the
Kaczkowski court concluded that the evidentiary method was
the best method to compute lost future earnings because it
viewed expert testimony as essential to accurate economic
forecasting.47 Using a hybrid approach, the court combined
tucky. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Gayle, 263 S.W. 763 (Ky. 1924).
41 655 S.W.2d at 24.
42 Defendants raised several additional issues on appeal, including failure to in-
struct the jury on tax impact.
43 655 S.W.2d at 26. See text accompanying notes 29-35 supra for a discussion of
the Beaulieu approach to inflation.
44 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1980).
41 See id. at 1037-38. Pennsylvania now applies the "total offset" method as a
matter of law. Thus, all Pennsylvania courts must utilize the method to compensate
for inflation. Id. at 1038-39.
4' See id. at 1032-34 (quoting Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796 (Pa.
1964)). The new conditions referred to by the court were related to a change in opin-
ion regarding the ability to define and predict inflation and productivity. Id. at 1032.
'1 See id. at 1035. The court in Kaczkowski specifically rejected the middle
ground approach as inaccurate and unpredictable. Id. at 1034-35.
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Feldman's4s allowance of productivity gains (based on expert
testimony) with Beaulieu's49 use of the "total offset" method
to compensate for inflation. °
Kaczkowski is instructive because the case shows how to
account realistically for the entire range of productivity gains
in determining lost future earnings. The Pennsylvania court
rejected the rationale relied upon in Beaulieu that wage gains
are comprised solely of inflationary factors.51 If the goal is full
compensation, then the court has a duty to insure that the
plaintiff is not undercompensated because of outdated as-
sumptions about wage increases.52 Although the Kentucky
Court of Appeals moved in the right direction by disallowing
reduction to present value, 53 it may have done so without ade-
quately accounting for all the variables that constitute future
gains in earnings, including educational attainment prior to
entry into the labor market, the influence of age on lifetime
48 Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 524 F.2d 384 (1st Cir. 1975). See text accom-
panying notes 22-26 supra for a discussion of the Feldman approach to productivity
factors.
40 Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1969). See text accompanying notes
30-35 supra for a discussion of the Beaulieu application of the "total offset" method
to account for inflation.
'o See 421 A.2d at 1036 (citing Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp.
at 1271; Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d at 665). The Pennsylvania court noted that the
Beaulieu court's refusal to consider merit-based increases discriminated against per-
sons whose salaries depend on their skill, experience and value to their employer. Id.
at 1037.
51 See id. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Terry apparently relied on the
Beaulieu rationale. However, it is unclear from the Terry opinion what kind of expert
testimony was allowed at trial concerning the injured child's diminished future earn-
ing power, since that issue was not considered on appeal. See Paducah Area Pub.
Library v. Terry, 655 S.W.2d at 23.
52 Focusing solely on inflation is unrealistic in- view of the fact that money wages
have steadily increased for the last several decades, along with productivity and price
levels. Between 1947 and 1973, the compound rate of interest in the consumer price
index was 2.8% per annum, while the index of hourly construction earnings rose by
5.6% per annum. The index of average hourly earnings in manufacturing increased at
a compound rate of five percent. Consequently, the major cause in the rise of money
earnings is not inflation, but factors associated with increases in productivity such as
mechanization, job experience, merit increases and maturity in general. See Hender-
son, supra note 24, at 314-23. See also UNrrED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 175 (1973) (showing increases in
output per man-hour and increases in compensation from 1947 to 1972).
53 See 655 S.W.2d at 25.
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earnings, and the significance of productivity and growth. 4
C. Alaska's Modification of the Beaulieu Approach
Apparently recognizing the wisdom of Kaczkowski,
Alaska recently modified its approach to wage increases. In
State v. Harris,55 the Alaska Supreme Court reaffirmed the
Beaulieu "total offset" approach to inflation,56 but limited the
Beaulieu rationale to a refusal to recognize speculative pro-
ductivity gains (as compared with specific productivity
gains).57 If increases are reasonably certain and not lacking in
specificity, then such evidence is admissible.5 8 The Harris
opinion is an example of a court applying the "total offset"
method, while also being careful to distinguish between infla-
tion and other productivity factors (not attributable to infla-
tion) that combine to constitute lost future earnings.59 More
importantly, the Alaska court indicated a willingness to strive
for accuracy despite the inconvenience to judge and jury re-
sulting from the introduction of expert testimony on predict-
able productivity factors not attributable to inflation. Such a
See Henderson, supra note 24, at 312.
5 662 P.2d 946 (Alaska 1983).
51 See id..at 948 (citing Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1969)). See notes
30-35 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Beaulieu application of
the "total offset" method to account for inflation.
17 See 662 P.2d at 947 (citing Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d at 668). See note 35
supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Beaulieu approach to productiv-
ity factors.
'8 662 P.2d at 948. The Alaska method is now a restricted version of the Pennsyl-
vania method. The Pennsylvania method allows expert testimony regarding specula-
tive as well as automatic productivity gains. See Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d at
1037. The Alaska method restricts this expert testimony to a "consideration of auto-
matic step increases keyed to length of service which are by their very nature certain
and predictable." 662 P.2d at 947.
" See 662 P.2d at 947-48.
60 Cf. id. at 948. But cf. Paducah Area Pub. Library v. Terry, 655 S.W.2d at 19,
where the Kentucky court seems overly concerned with the efficiency of the "total
offset" method without a similar commitment to accuracy:
Much can be said for the rule of the trial judge, and much may be said
against it, but suffice it to say that such a rule goes far to eliminate the
contest between litigants who have the resources to marshall mountains of
expert testimony relative to money, its worth and the nebulous art of eco-
nomic forecasting, all of which encumber the trial proceedings and confuse
the deliberation of jurors.
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careful delineation of factors comprising the total verdict is
absent from the Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision in
Terry.
D. Kentucky's Unclear Application of the "Total Offset"
Method
Terry presents a question concerning how Kentucky
courts are to apply the "total offset" method. Are entucky
courts to follow the Beaulieu approach, looing only at infla-
tion to the exclusion of all other relevant factors constituting
wage gains, or should courts follow the Harris approach and
consider other relevant wage gain factors? Considering the
painstaking detail of recent Pennsylvania and Alaska deci-
sions, Kentucky courts should also have guidelines for apply-
ing the "total offset" method. As recent case law makes clear,
the "total offset" method is best applied not as an after-
thoughts' but as one component in a carefully controlled judi-
cial proceeding,62 balancing the- desire for accuracy with the
need for efficiency and predictability.
In Terry the appellee properly proved a diminished earn-
ing capacity by expert testimony.6 However, it is unclear
whether such "proper proof' included productivity gains or
simply calculated damages in present dollars6 4 under the as-
sumption that by not reducing the award to present worth the
Id. at 25.
61 See State v. Harris, 662 P.2d at 946; Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d at
1027. See also Draisma v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (court
found, through separate analysis of each figure, that inflation and discount rate were
same); Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974) (court required evidence that
inflation rate and discount rate would completely offset each other).
62 See, e.g., Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d at 1037.
63 See 655 S.W.2d at 23. Under Kentucky law, "proper proof" means only that
expert testimony be confined to average statistics about future earnings when, as in
Terry, the injured party has yet to establish a prior work history. See Adams v. Da-
vis, 578 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
64 Further ambiguity arises near the end of the opinion with the statement: "The
jury may make a fair and reasonable award in present worth without introduction of
evidence or instruction [on reduction to present worth or inflation]." 655 S.W.2d at
25. This suggests that all awards are in present dollars and based on present day
figures with no allowance for future productivity.
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plaintiff would be compensated for future inflation. 5 Failure
to adequately explain how the "total offset" method has been
applied leaves future Kentucky courts without guidance con-
cerning productivity factors and future plaintiffs without the
assurance that they will be fully and fairly compensated for
lost or diminished earning power.66
III. INADEQUACY OF THE DISCOUNT RATE IN OFFSETTING
INFLATION AND OTHER PRODUCTIVITY FACTORS
Even those courts applying the "total offset" method as
part of a carefully controlled judicial proceeding must ascer-
tain that the "total offset" method is based on correct as-
sumptions about the relationship of the discount rate to infla-
tion and other productivity factors. Much has been written,
both favorable 7 and critical,68 about the utility of the "total
offset" method. Often used by economists and attorneys, this
simple method is helpful as long as the projected growth rate
in earnings (due to inflation and other productivity factors) is
15 This is the Beaulieu approach to inflation. See Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d at
665. That approach was modified when the Alaska Supreme Court allowed careful
consideration of both inflation and productivity as integral factors in computing lost
future earnings. See State v. Harris, 662 P.2d at 948.
60 One author has strongly emphasized the need for guidance in making accurate
damage awards:
Determining loss of prospective earnings requires the use of statistics, mor-
tality annuity tables, and the like. In this area of proof, jurors have proved
equal to the task. It is easy to say that a slavish statistical exactitude is not
to be sought. On the other hand, in measuring damages caused by the
wrongful killing of a husband and father, for example, we must strive to be
accurate. Any tools that will aid us in this regard should not be ignored.
The jurors are not expected to appreciate all the intricacies of economic
theory. But they live with inflation every day of the year, and are well able
to grasp the basic concepts involved. We do not want merely a reasonable
approximation of the plaintiff's losses. We want as accurate an approxima-
tion of that loss as possible!
S. SPEISER, supra note 14, at 741.
*" See Carlson, supra note 32, at 628; Fleming, Inflation and Tort Compensa-
tion, 26 AM. JUR. Comp. L. 51 (1978); Franz, Simplifying Future Lost Earnings,
TRIAL, Aug. 1977, at 34; Sherman, Projection of Economic Loss: Inflation v. Present
Value, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 723 (1981); Note, supra note 11, at 105.
08 See S. SPEISER, supra note 14, at 4 12:2; Coyne, supra note 32, at 25; Formuzis
& O'Donnell, Inflation and the Valuation of Future Economic Losses, 38 MONT. L.
REV. 297 (1977); Maher, Estimating Future Earnings Loss: Misinterpretation and
Faulty Logic, TRIAL, Feb. 1979, at 39.
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equal to the discount rate prevailing at the time of the ap-
praisal.0 9 However, when applied as a conclusion of law, 0 the
court makes a finding of fact that has not been proven at
trial.71
John Carlson has theorized about the relationship of wage
gains to interest rates. 2 Believing they cancel each other out,
he argues that just as interest rates tend to rise when inflation
climbs are expected, wages tend to rise along with gains in
labor and capital productivity.7 3 In addition, Carlson notes
that wage gains are bid upward by the rate of inflation. 4
Thus, wage gains are comprised of two fundamental compo-
nents-inflation and productivity-while interest rates are
made up of anticipated inflation and the real rate of return on
investments.7 5 If productivity approximates the real rate of re-
turn on investments, then wage gains cancel out interest rates
69 A leading expert in the field of damage recovery has shown that if earnings
grow at seven percent and the prevailing rate of interest on safe investment (discount
rate) is seven percent the result is that the compounding effects cancel out. In this
situation, present value is simply calculated by multiplying the base earning figure by
the number of productive years the individual might have enjoyed. S. SPEISER, supra
note 14, at 721.
70 See Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d 1027, 1038-39 (Pa. 1980) ("we find as a
matter of law that future inflation shall be presumed equal to future interest rates
with these factors offsetting"). In Terry, the court of appeals did not require adoption
of the "total offset" method as a conclusion of law; rather, the court left application
of this method to the trial court's discretion. Paducah Area Pub. Library v. Terry,
655 S.W.2d 19, 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) ("The injection of such matters in the trial is
. . . within the discretion of the trial court.").
11 In Terry, the trial court judge excluded all evidence of an appropriate discount
rate because all evidence relative to "future inflation" was also excluded. 655 S.W.2d
at 25. This was a blind application of the "total offset" method.
72 See Carlson, supra note 32, at 628. Carlson expands the proposition adhered
to by the Pennsylvania and Alaska courts that interest rates and inflation rates cancel
each other out. He argues that productivity factors, not merely inflation rates, cancel
out the discount rate. See id. at 628-31.
71 See id. at 630. See also note 31 supra for a discussion of the effect of inflation-
ary expectations on interest rates.
74 See Carlson, supra note 32, at 630.
75 Real return on investment is that sum of capital actually produced over and
above the rate of inflation. The nominal return on investment contains both a real
rate and an inflation figure. This lends further credence to the argument that infla-
tion alone does not totally offset the discount rate. Rather, returns on investment
tend to exceed the rate of inflation by an amount equal to the real return on invest-
ment. See id. at 630. See generally I. FISHER, supra note 31.
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since inflation is a constant."6 To support his argument, Carl-
son shows that from 1950 to 1974 average increases in com-
pensation per man hour77 and average yields on taxablegov-
ernment bonds were roughly equivalent.78
Economist Thomas Coyne has criticized Carlson's analy-
sis by stating: "The approach is appealing in its simplicity but
it cannot be supported empirically. ' 79 Coyne points out that
averages only serve a worthwhile purpose where there is no
specific data for the case being analyzed. 0 Averages are not
helpful in wrongful death or injury cases since they always in-
volve a specific individual. 1
Another economist, John Maher, also rejects Carlson's
measurement of the percentage change in hourly compensa-
tion by year-to-year calculations.82 Maher contends that fu-
ture earnings changes cannot be estimated from an average of
past year-to-year changes because that change might involve a
drop in earnings, as well as a rise in the increase of earnings.8
76 Carlson, supra note 32, at 630 ("[I]f real returns on investment are at all close
to productivity gains to labor, then interest rates reflect the current state of expecta-
tions about future wage gains.").
77 Id. Carlson uses average "increases in compensation per man hour" even
though the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes wage increase statistics for no
less than eleven different occupational areas, each of which has a different increase in
compensation per man hour.
78 Id. One obvious weakness in his calculations is the admitted fact that unantic-
ipated inflation results in much higher wage growth without the accompanying
growth in bond rates. Only when inflation has been fully anticipated have bond prices
and wage increases been very close together. Id.
7" See Coyne, supra note 32, at 26. He lists five areas where Carlson's data is
inadequate: (1) the 24-year time span, used by Carlson in his calculations, is a rela-
tively short time for many, if not most, wrongful death or injury cases; (2) the time
period he uses includes a disproportionately large number of recessionary months; (3)
the 1.6% difference in averages of Carlson's two rates is significant when applied in
present value analysis over a long period of time (Coyne calculated average annual
compensation per man hour at 5.812% and an average bond yield of 4.2512%); (4)
high standard deviations for each series of data means large dispersions from the
mean in any given year; and (5) the two rates and their accompanying standard devi-
ations cause him to believe the discount rate does not exactly offset projected wage
increases for the time span used. "Quite simply, his assumptions cannot be supported
by his data." Id.
80 See id.
8! Id. at 27.
82 See Maher, supra note 68, at 39.
83 See id. at 40. Maher points out that year-to-year percentage changes between
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Instead, Maher argues that "[t]he commonly accepted way of
estimating future earnings is the fitting of a trend line to the
observed data. '8 4 Using a hypothetical case, Maher com-
pounds the base earnings"5 and then reduces them to present
value employing a 2.68 % discount rate (the yield on govern-
ment securities prevailing in 1952). The result is the amount a
"clairvoyant" economist would have reached.86 As a result,
Maher finds that the "cancellation" economist 7 would have
undercompensated the plaintiff by 18% on a twenty-five year
award. 8 From this, he concludes that "cancellation of the rate
of advance in earnings by the discount rate gives estimates
that are low and with errors that have usually been substan-
tially larger than those of the economist who separately deter-
mines the rate of earnings increase." 89
IV. ALTERNATIVES
Since the "total offset" method has been seriously at-
tacked as not properly reflecting inflation and productivity in-
creases, a viable alternative is needed. Several alternatives
have been outlined above.90 Others are beyond the scope of
this Comment.9 1 Some courts choose the "total offset" method
0, 10 and 20 would average out to a 10% change regardless of whether the figures
were ascending or descending. See id.
8 Id. Maher's trend line reveals three distinct time periods: from 1952 to 1965
the average annual increase was 3.6%; from 1965 to 1971, 5.4%; and from 1971 to
1977, 7.8%. Id. at 39.
81 See id. Maher compounds earnings at 3.4% to 1965; at 5.4% to 1971; and
7.8% to 1977.
88 Id. Maher also figures the earnings that a "typical" economist might have esti-
mated by projecting a five percent annual increase in earnings across the board. See
id.
" Id. This is Maher's name for Carlson and other economists who advocate that
the discount rate cancels the rate of earnings increase.
88 Id. The "typical" economist would have over compensated the plaintiff by
10.6%.
89 Id. at 41.
90 See notes 72-89 supra for a discussion of these alternative methods.
91 Compare Elliget, The Periodic Payment of Judgments, 46 INs. CouNsEL J. 130
(1979) with Henderson, Periodic Payments of Bodily Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A. J. 734
(1980). Both authors are responding to the recent draft of the UNIF. PERIoDIC PAY-
MENT OF JUDGMENT ACT, 14 U.L.A. 20 (Supp. 1983)).
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because of a high priority on efficiency.2 Yet, as one econo-
mist states, "[i]f simplification in courtroom presentations is
desired, the highest degree achievable may be in getting a
stipulated methodology, not an equalization of interest
rates."93
Rejection of the "total offset" method as a general rule in
favor of separate determinations of average annual wage in-
creases and discount rates offers the most accurate, predict-
able and efficient methodology.94 Economists Formuzis and
O'Donnell have developed such a procedure, 5 which is similar
to the offset approach, yet rests on two radically different,
more realistic assumptions. Those assumptions are: (1) the ap-
propriate discount rate is the average yield on U.S. govern-
ment securities of up to five years maturity,"6 and (2) the
trend in wage changes is 1.4% higher than this discount
rate.9 7 The authors calculate this 1.4% figure by using regres-
sion analysis to statistically establish the differential between
wage growth and interest rates.9 8 Using this analysis, the court
'2 See, e.g., State v. Harris, 662 P.2d 946 (Alaska 1983).
'3 See Coyne, supra note 32, at 29.
"4 See text accompanying note 11 supra for a discussion of the policy objectives
in calculating damages.
'5 See Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 68, at 297. The approach they have
utilized has been named "regression analysis." See id. at 302.
96 Id. Shorter term securities necessitate the periodic sale of maturing securities.
This protects the plaintiff or survivors from the ravages of inflation to the extent that
inflation and higher yields are correlated. Id.
97 Id. Formuzis and O'Donnell believe that "forecasting inflation by projecting
the historical rate of inflation is unacceptable because it is unreliable and specula-
tive." Id. at 299. They also reject Carlson's idea that wage growth and interest rates
change equally in the presence of inflation. Formuzis and O'Donnell suggest that "the
rate of wage growth and the rate of interest do not change equally in the presence of
inflation. They do, however, change in a predictable fashion." Id.
" See id. Accepting the "Fisher principal" that wage increases and interest rates
co-vary, the authors argue that wage growth is consistently greater than interest rates
on short term investments by 1.4%. Id. at 300, 302. The difference is due primarily to
the relationship between the rate of increase in labor productivity and the rate of
return on capital (i.e., productivity of capital) respectively. Id. at 300. For further
support of this idea, see Coyne, supra note 32, at 26, where the author points out that
Carlson, in his calculations, found a 1.6% difference in averages between the two
rates. The variance between Carlson's number (1.6%) and Formuzis and O'Donnell's
(1.4%) can be accounted for by noting that Carlson uses yearly averages while
Formuzis and O'Donnell use three-year moving averages.
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simply calculates the rate of discount99 and then sets the rate
of wage growth at 1.4% above the discount rate.100 This calcu-
lation corrects the downward bias of the "total offset" method
noted above. 101
By correcting for the downward bias, awards are more ac-
curate. Judges and juries are also given an efficient way in
which to compensate for all productivity factors without ex-
tensive expert testimony. 10 2  Perhaps most importantly,
9 Formuzis & O'Donnell, supra note 31, at 305 ('The rate of the discount
should be calculated from riskless government securities with an average maturity of
3 years.").
100 For example, assume that the decedent in a wrongful death action is deter-
mined to have a $40,000 per year earning capacity with a three year estimated life
span. The discount rate, based on the rate of government securities, is seven percent.
Under the "total offset" method, wage growth is presumed to equal the discount rate
and, in effect, cancel each other out. The damage award would be calculated as
follows:
$40,000 X 3 years = $120,000
In comparison, under the Formuzis and O'Donnell approach, wage growth would
be set at 1.4% above the discount rate. The damage award would be calculated for
each year according to the following formula:
Future value Present value Damages awarded
$40,000 X factor for that X factor for that = for that year
year at 8.4% year at 7.0%
This formula yields the following result:
1
year 1 $40,000 X (1.084)1 X = $ 41,550(1.07)'
1
year 2 $40,000 X (1.084)1 X - 41,031(1.07)2
1 _
year 3 $40,000 X (1.084)' X 40,541(1.07)1 $123,122
Over the three year span, the Formuzis and O'Donnell approach gives the plaintiff
$3,122 or 2.6% more than the award determined under the "total offset" method.
1*1 See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra for a discussion of the downward
bias of the "total offset" method.
102 It would be possible for a court to increase accuracy by using regression anal-
ysis to calculate a specific differential for a particular occupation using the statistics
published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
However, in most cases, the 1.4% differential is sufficient to fairly compensate the
plaintiff. See notes 52 & 77 supra for discussions of labor statistics and occupational
wage increases.
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Formuzis and O'Donnell provide a predictable methodology
which removes speculative variables from projecting inflation
and other productivity factors, leading to more settlements
and fewer court battles.
CONCLUSION
In the early 1970s, inflation came to be an accepted part
of damage award verdicts for lost future earnings. More re-
cently, courts have begun accounting for inflation and produc-
tivity factors when estimating future wages. Yet, deciding how
to include these somewhat unpredictable variables in a man-
ner which is accurate and predictable while still efficient has
been a challenge for the courts. Kentucky's application of the
"total offset" method was a response to that challenge. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals succeeded in interjecting new con-
siderations into the damage award process; however, the court
failed to adequately set out all the relevant factors in the "to-
tal offset" approach. Recent applications of the offset method
by other courts more experienced in its use show that full and
fair compensation requires Kentucky to consider other pro-
ductivity factors along with inflation in calculating awards for
lost future earnings.
Accepting the premise of the "total offset" ap-
proach-that awards can be efficient and accurate-another
technique using regression analysis is posited. By setting the
wage increases at 1.4% higher than the discount rate, courts
can simultaneously correct for the downward bias of the can-
cellation method while also accounting for both inflation and
productivity gains-an efficient, accurate calculation that
removes from the jury the often unpredictable task of calcu-
lating future wage earnings by expert testimony.
Alexander M. Waidrop
1983-84]

